Poverty Alleviation and Interhousehold Transfers: Evidence from BRAC’s Graduation Program in Bangladesh

Very poor homes usually count on transfers from their social networks for consumption smoothing, however there is constrained proof on how antipoverty programs impact casual transfers. This paper exploits the randomized rollout of BRAC’s ultra-bad graduation program in Bangladesh and panel info covering above 21,000 homes above seven years to examine the program’s results on interhousehold transfers. The program crowds out casual transfers received by the qualified homes, but this is pushed mainly by exterior-village transfers. Dealt with ultra-bad homes turn out to be much more probably to the two give and get transfers to/from wealthier homes in just their village and a lot less probably to get transfers from their businesses. As a outcome, the reciprocity of their in just-village transfers increases. The conclusions suggest that, in just rural communities, there is constructive assortative matching by socio-economic status. A reduction in poverty permits homes to engage much more in reciprocal transfer preparations and lowers the interlinkage of their labor with casual insurance.