Efficiency, Legitimacy, and Impacts of Targeting Methods: Evidence from an Experiment in Niger
No EntryPoverty ReductionNov 2021
The procedures to pick safety web beneficiaries are the matter of recurrent debates. Targeting assessments normally aim on effectiveness by documenting the pre-plan profile of chosen beneficiaries. This analyze offers a more extensive assessment of targeting efficiency by an experiment embedded in a nationwide funds transfer plan in Niger. Eligible villages were being randomly assigned to have beneficiary households chosen by neighborhood-based targeting (CBT), proxy-usually means screening (PMT), or a components to detect the food stuff-insecure (FCS). The analyze considers targeting legitimacy and the impression of targeting alternative on plan usefulness based on information gathered soon after plan roll-out. PMT is more effective in pinpointing households with lower intake for every capita. Nonbeneficiaries find components-based procedures (PMT and FCS) more respectable than CBT. Manipulation and information imperfections have an effect on CBT, which can reveal why it is not the most respectable. Plan impacts on some welfare dimensions are larger sized among households chosen by PMT than CBT.
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